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This paper examines the impact of public health insurance expansions through both Medicaid and
SCHIP on children’s educational outcomes, measured by 4th and 8th grade reading and math test scores,
available from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).  We use a triple difference
estimation strategy, taking advantage of the cross-state variation over time and across ages in children’s
health insurance eligibility.  Using this approach, we find that test scores in reading, but not math,
increased for those children affected at birth by increased health insurance eligibility.  A 50 percentage
point increase in eligibility is found to increase reading test scores by 0.09 standard deviations.  We
also examine whether the improvements in educational outcomes can be at least partially attributed
to improvements in health status itself.  First, we provide further evidence that increases in eligibility
are linked to improvements in health status at birth.  Second, we show that better health status at birth
(measured by rates of low birth-weight and infant mortality), is linked to improved educational outcomes.
Although the methods used to support this last finding do not completely eliminate potentially confounding
















  The main goal of expanding access to health insurance is to improve the health of the 
population.  The most recent policy interventions designed to address that goal were expansions 
to the Medicaid system and the introduction of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP).  These policies made available public health insurance coverage to children from 
families with incomes that previously would have been too high to qualify.  Despite evidence of 
some crowd-out of private health insurance coverage, they have been shown to improve 
children’s health status, as reviewed below. 
  Yet the benefits associated with increased public health insurance coverage may extend 
beyond improvements in health status.  In particular, one could imagine that these interventions 
may improve educational outcomes.  Two potential mechanisms could generate such a result.  
First, children in poor health may be poorly equipped to learn; alleviating their health problems 
could remove barriers that would enable them to succeed in the classroom.
1  Second, educational 
outcomes may improve even if crowd-out dampens the health impact.  Families that switch from 
private to public health insurance would have additional resources that may be devoted towards 
human capital development. 
The goal of this paper is to address this issue, examining the impact of public health 
insurance expansions (through both Medicaid and SCHIP) on children’s educational outcomes.  
In our analysis, we examine the health-related determinants of educational performance, 
                                                 
1 The policy community has been clear in its recognition of the problem.  For instance, the U.S. Department of 
Education has provided a review of the factors that hinder student achievement with the goal towards finding ways 
to promote academic success (Rossi and Montgomery, 2004).  The review states that “poor health and untreated 
physical conditions may slow a child's academic progress. Recurrent illness, for example, may interfere with 
attentiveness and attendance, and vision or hearing problems may make class participation difficult.”  The National 
Governors Association is also promoting interventions to improve children’s health as a mechanism to improve 
academic performance (National Governors Association, 2000).   2 
 
measured by test scores in reading in math at ages 9 and 13, available from the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).  We begin our analysis relying on the cross-state 
variation over time and across ages in children’s health insurance eligibility brought about by the 
Medicaid expansions and the introduction of SCHIP.  The availability of test scores at different 
ages in the same year provides the opportunity to implement a triple-difference estimation 
strategy.  Using this approach, we find evidence that test scores in reading, but not math, 
increased for those children affected at birth by the increase in health insurance eligibility. 
We go on to examine the potential mechanism for this effect.  Specifically, we seek to 
determine whether the improvements in educational outcomes can be attributed to improvements 
in health status itself.  First, we provide further evidence that increases in eligibility are linked to 
improvements in health status at birth.  In states/years in which public health insurance was more 
broadly available, the rate of births with low birth-weight declines.  This effect is larger for less-
educated mothers, as one would expect based on eligibility rules.  Second, we go on to show that 
better health status at birth, as measured by rates of low birth-weight and infant mortality, is 
linked to improved educational outcomes.  Although this last finding is based on a methodology 
that does not completely eliminate potentially confounding factors, we believe it is strongly 
suggestive that improving children’s health will improve their performance in the classroom. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is an extensive clinical literature relating poor child health to worse cognitive and 
behavioral outcomes.  Children with chronic conditions, like asthma, have been found to be more 
likely to repeat a grade and are more poorly behaved (Gortmaker, et al. 1990).  Children with 
chronic conditions that are not well treated are especially at risk.  For example, Diette, et al. 3 
 
(2000) find that children with asthma that is not well-controlled are more likely to miss school. 
Fowler et al. (1992) find that asthma is associated with more grade retention; this relationship is 
stronger among children from low-income families than high-income families.  Gozal (1998) 
finds that children who are treated for sleep apnea improve their school performance after 
treatment. Children with ADHD are more likely to be retained or drop out, have lower grades 
and exhibit worse behavior (Barkley 2002).
2  This literature, however, is plagued by the inability 
to distinguish causal mechanisms from mere associations.  
An alternative strand of the literature focuses on the relationship between health care and 
well-being using strategies better-suited for identifying causal effects. In their review of the 
evidence on the causal impact of health insurance coverage, Levy and Meltzer (2008, p. 406) 
conclude that “the evidence available to date conclusively demonstrates that health insurance 
improves the health of vulnerable subpopulations” such as infants and children.  
Past research has also focused on the impact of the expansion of the Medicaid system, as 
we do, finding that it led to improved health outcomes for children.  Currie and Gruber (1996b) 
find that it improved mothers’ prenatal care, substantially reducing infant mortality and the 
incidence of low birth weight.  Currie and Gruber (1996a) find that Medicaid expansions reduced 
child mortality by over 5 percent.
3  Dafny and Gruber (2005) find that increased Medicaid 
eligibility reduced the incidence of avoidable hospitalizations, which have apparently been 
prevented by more appropriate care through an early contact with a primary care physician.  
                                                 
2 Currie & Stabile (2006) provide evidence that ADHD symptoms decrease school achievement and attainment 
within the context of a sibling difference model, which is more indicative of a causal effect. 
 
3 This reduction in child mortality may actually lead to a reduction in test scores if the marginal children who are 
born are lower than average performers on standardized tests.  Any improvement in test scores that we are able to 
attribute to increased health insurance coverage is actually net of this effect.  The practical implications of this issue 
may be rather limited, however, because infant mortality rates are so low (in the vicinity of 1 percent over the 
sample period) that a five percent reduction in infant mortality means that these marginal children will only increase 
the size of the birth cohort by an additional .05 percent of children born.  4 
 
Some evidence also shows that the more recently introduced SCHIP program has led to 
improved health outcomes for children.  LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) show that SCHIP is 
associated with an increase in health insurance coverage among the eligible, uninsured 
population.  Joyce and Racine (2003) find that SCHIP increases the probability that a child 
receives a newly approved vaccine.  We also provide additional evidence later in this paper that 
eligibility expansions improved children’s health.   
Although public insurance expansions were primarily designed to cover the uninsured, 
one possible response is for individuals to give up their private insurance coverage and replace it 
with less expensive public coverage.  This is a phenomenon known in the literature as “crowd-
out,” and a considerable body of research has documented its existence (Cutler and Gruber 1996, 
1997; Dubay and Kenney 1996, 1997; Blumberg, Dubay and Norton 2000; Yazici and Kaestner 
2000; Shore-Sheppard 2005; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005; and Gruber and Simon, 2008).  
There is no evidence to suggest, however, that crowd-out is complete, so the expansions in health 
insurance access did increase actual insurance coverage for at least some children.  Past research 
has also focused on the impact of crowd-out on household spending under the theory that crowd-
out will free up some resources previously spent on insurance coverage for children.  Gruber and 
Yelowitz (1999) find that households targeted by the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s significantly increased their spending in other areas.  In the end, the literature on the 
impact of recent public health insurance expansions indicates that children’s health did improve, 
but crowd-out occurred as well.  As we described earlier, both effects may have been at work 
improving educational performance; examining this relationship is the focus of this paper. 
Past research also provides evidence on the role of family resources on children’s 
educational outcomes.  Much of this literature, reviewed by Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and 5 
 
Mayer (1997), relies on correlational analysis and fails to isolate the causal effect of family 
resources on child outcomes.  Two recent additions, however, effectively isolate the causal 
effects.  Morris, Duncan and Rodrigues (2004) combine evidence from several randomly 
assigned welfare reform demonstrations and are able to separate the effect of increases in income 
from the other aspects of treatment.  They find that a $1,000 increase in family income improves 
child test scores by 6 percent of a standard deviation.  Dahl and Lochner (2005) use expansions 
in the Earned Income Tax Credit to isolate the effect of changes in income on child test scores.  
They find that a $1,000 increase in family income improves child reading scores by 3.6 percent 
of a standard deviation, and math scores by 2.1 percent.   
Currie (2008) provides a comprehensive review of the role that children’s health status 
plays in determining subsequent socioeconomic outcomes, including education.  Her main 
conclusion is that “in developed countries, there has been relatively little examination of the 
question of whether poor health in childhood is linked to lower future socioeconomic status 
(p. 26).”  Much of the literature that exists is plagued by difficulties in identifying causality, 
relying on correlations instead.  Case, Fertig and Paxson (2005) use unusually rich panel data 
from Great Britain and find that, after controlling for family background characteristics, 
unhealthy children attain less schooling.  Although this is an important finding, issues of 
unobservable heterogeneity remain.  Bleakley (2007) finds that the health improvements induced 
by the eradication of hookworm – which infected a large proportion of Southern school-aged 
children around 1910 – led to increased school attendance and literacy.  This study has the 
advantage of a strong identification strategy, but its relevance to modern-day changes in health 
status is questionable.     6 
 
One area in which credible methodologies have been applied to related questions is the 
relationship between low birth weight and later educational outcomes.  Several studies have 
measured differences in educational outcomes between siblings/twins associated with differences 
in their birth weight (cf. Conley and Bennett, 2000; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2001; Boardman 
et al., 2002; and Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2007).  All find that low birth weight leads to 
poorer academic performance, usually measured as total years of education attained. 
 
III. MEDICAID EXPANSIONS AND SCHIP 
Part of our research design focuses on the variation in public health insurance eligibility 
that is associated with the expansions of the Medicaid system in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
and the introduction of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in the late 1990s.  
In this section, we review the institutional arrangements that generate this policy variability.  
The Medicaid system is the main government program that provides health insurance to 
the poor.  Prior to 1984, eligibility for Medicaid among those who were not elderly or disabled 
was strongly tied to eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  Between 
1984 and 1992, eligibility was decoupled from AFDC and was widely expanded – first to 
pregnant women through 1987, and then after that to poor families with income levels that had 
previously been too high to qualify for the program, up to 185 percent of the poverty line.  These 
policy changes led to a dramatic increase in the fraction of children who were eligible for 
Medicaid; the percentage of children 0 to 15 eligible more than doubled, from about 14 percent 
to about 31 percent between 1983 and 1996 (Gruber, 2003).  The SCHIP program, introduced in 
1997, allowed states to expand eligibility to older children and to further raise income eligibility 
thresholds. 7 
 
Table 1 details the differences in children’s health insurance eligibility as a result of the 
Medicaid expansions and the introduction of SCHIP between 1988 and 2004 and between states 
for the five most populous states.  Over time, each state (generally) increased the income 
threshold under which children could qualify for Medicaid.  These thresholds tended to begin at 
the poverty line in the late 1980s and more recently have crept up to two or three times that.  In 
the late 1980s, only infants in these low-income households were eligible, but the maximum age 
that would enable one to qualify for benefits has also risen over time so that children meeting the 
(now higher) income thresholds are eligible for benefits through the end of their teen years.  Both 
of these types of changes occurred at different rates in different states. 
Because of the differences in timing and generosity, otherwise similar children residing 
in different states may have been treated differently by the Medicaid system measured at a point 
in time or cumulatively over their entire lives.  Table 2 presents an example of this, documenting 
these differences for children who continuously reside in the five largest states, who were born in 
1986, 1988, and 1990, and whose family income was at 120 percent of the poverty level in each 
year since birth.  The results of this simulation exercise show the wide variety of health 
insurance exposure that these children face.  Lifetime exposure varies between 1 and 7 years by 
age 9 and between 2 and 11 years by age 13.  Some children are covered at birth.  Children born 
in different states at the same time and children born within a state at different times all had 
differential exposure to public health insurance.   
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
In our analysis, we begin by focusing on the reduced form impact of access to public 
health insurance on educational outcomes.  We then recognize that this impact may be generated 8 
 
either by improvements in health status or through the additional income generated if the 
availability of public health insurance crowds out privately purchased health insurance.  We 
subsequently attempt to determine whether we can identify a direct impact of the health 
improvements itself. 
All of this can be characterized by the following structural model of educational 
outcomes: 
  01 2 3 ist ist ist ist ist EH I X δ δδ δε =+ + + + (1) 
 
  01 2 ist st ist ist HP H I X u γ γγ = ++ +  (2) 
 
  01 2 ist st ist ist I PHI X v λ λλ = ++ +  (3) 
 
where Eist represents some measure of educational performance for individual i in state s at time 
t, Hist represents the child’s health status, Iist represents the child’s family income, Xist is a 
composite variable that represents other individual-specific factors that are related to school 
outcomes, PHIst represents provisions of the state’s public health insurance policies for lower 
income children, which depends upon the particular year and the child’s state of residence, and 
εist, uist, and νist represent random error terms.  The reduced for specification of this structural 
model would take the form: 
  01 2 ist st ist ist EP H I X β ββ υ = ++ +  (4) 
 
In this model the coefficient, β1, represents the impact on educational performance associated 
with a child’s exposure to public health insurance eligibility.   
We begin our analysis by estimating equation (4) to determine whether we are able to 
find any reduced form effect.  In practice, we augment this model (and all subsequent models) 
with state fixed effects (to control for longstanding differences across states in things like 
willingness to fund social programs and other underlying cultural differences) and year fixed 9 
 
effects (to control for arbitrary movements in educational outcomes over time that occur in all 
states simultaneously).  This approach represents a differences-in-differences estimator of the 
impact of public health insurance on educational outcomes.  Difference-in-difference models 
suffer from the imperfection that time varying factors within states – such as state-level 
accountability policies or abrupt changes in school funding levels – cannot be captured by state 
or year fixed effects.  If these time-varying, state-specific factors are correlated to both health 
insurance eligibility and educational outcomes, then they may introduce bias.
4  To circumvent 
this problem, we use the fact that tests are given to children in different grades within state and 
year, but the children in different grades were subject to different health insurance eligibility 
rules.  This provides a third difference, allowing us to sweep out the effects of state-by-time 
specific effects.   
One limitation of this analysis is that it is impossible to determine whether any estimated 
impact of public health insurance access on education performance in equation (4) can be 
specifically attributable to the health or the income channel.  This can easily be seen based on 
equations (1) through (3).  If another variable were available that we could relate to health status 
or income, we could identify the specific mechanism, but we are unable to identify any such 
variable.   
As it stands, we focus on trying to determine whether health status plays a role in the 
reduced form relationship.  To do this, we first estimate a model similar in form to equation (2), 
attempting to provide further evidence on the relationship between public health insurance and 
improvements in children’s health.  Past research has extensively addressed this issue and found 
                                                 
4 Researchers also worry about “policy endogeneity,” where state policies respond to the outcome being examined.  
In the present context, however, it seems unlikely that states would enact legislation enacting health care in response 
to the latest state test score results. 10 
 
such a link, as described earlier.  Our contribution is to use a longer panel, combining the 
Medicaid expansions and the introduction of SCHIP, providing more power to the analysis.   
Second, we estimate a model similar in spirit to that in equation (1), but focusing on the 
relationship between educational outcomes and measures of children’s health status at birth.
5  An 
important caveat in this analysis is that it is difficult to attribute causality in the relationship 
between children’s health status and educational outcomes as estimated in models like this.  It 
could be the case that other underlying social conditions, either at the time the test scores were 
measured, or at the time of the children’s birth, were changing within the state that would 
generate a spurious relationship between test scores and health.  One should note that these 
problems may be attenuated because we also compare differences in test scores between 4
th and 
8
th graders as a function of differences in health status at birth since both groups would be 
exposed to many of the same contemporaneous factors.  Taking these differences would 
eliminate the bias introduced by the presence of such factors.  Nevertheless changes in 
underlying social conditions in the state that differentially affected the different birth cohorts 
could still introduce bias. 
 
V.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
  The two main variables represented in our empirical specification are the measures of 
educational performance and the measures of public health insurance eligibility.  In this section 
of the paper we will detail our sources, properties, and creation of these variables along with the 
remaining data used in our analysis. 
                                                 
5 In theory, we could also include “income” as in equation 1, but measured income would not capture the additional 
resources available to the family through public provision of child health insurance.  Expenditures would better 
capture that concept, but no such data are available. 11 
 
  The measures of educational performance that we use are test scores in reading and math 
from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which is sometimes referred to 
as the “nation’s report card.”  Exams are administered periodically to students in 4
th and 8
th 
grades to a nationally representative sample of students.  Beginning in 1990, states began to 
augment the national samples to create samples of students that were representative of their own 
populations.
6  Not all states participated in the early years, so our resulting data panel is 
unbalanced.  Tests in reading and math are the ones most commonly conducted and we will 
restrict our attention to them.
7  We use state-level average scaled scores (separately by grade), 
which range between 0 and 500.   
NAEP also collects information on a student’s demographic characteristics, including 
race/ethnicity, parental education level, and free lunch status, allowing us to calculate average 
scores for various subgroups.  The use of free lunch status would be of particular value in 
providing a potential third difference since those receiving free or reduced price lunches should 
be more likely to be subject to the expanded eligibility standards.  Unfortunately, free lunch data 
are only available beginning in 2000, restricting our sample size to such an extent that we were 
unable to obtain precise parameter estimates in such models.  Results across other subgroups 
were not significantly different, so we do not report those results below but they are available 
upon request. 
To measure the generosity of public health insurance, we follow Currie and Gruber 
(1996a) and employ a “simulated instrument” approach.  In this approach, we begin with a 
nationwide sample of children from the Current Population Survey and determine whether or not 
                                                 
6 The number of test takers within each state is roughly comparable across states.  This means that regression models 
that rely on cross-state variation over time do not need to be weighted by state population. 
7 Math scores are available for 4
th grade in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005 and for 8
th grade in 1990, 1992, 1996, 
2003, and 2005.  Reading scores are available for 4
th grade in 1992, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2005 and for 8
th 
grade in 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2005. 12 
 
they would be eligible for coverage under the rules in each state/year based on the child’s age 
and family income.
8  Since the sample is national in scope, and not state-specific, this approach 
provides a measure of the generosity of a state’s plan, but abstracts from differences in 
populations across states.  We can apply this approach directly to determine measures of 
contemporaneous eligibility rates in each state and in each year.  We can also make an additional 
assumption that the family’s income remained roughly constant and that the child lived in the 
same state since the child’s birth to construct a measure of lifetime public health insurance 
eligibility, much like we did in Table 2.
9  If we run our national sample of children through each 
state’s eligibility rules since the child was born, we can construct measures of exposure to public 
health insurance for each state and birth cohort.  Finally, we can use a similar approach to 
determine eligibility rates in the year the child was born.   
To create these simulated instruments, we use data from the March Current Population 
Surveys (CPS).  The March CPS provides data on family income in the preceding calendar year 
for a national sample of roughly 100,000 individuals each year.  We can select children from 
these data, attach their families’ income to them, and then run them through a program that 
would identify their simulated health insurance eligibility at birth, in the years since birth, and at 
present depending upon when they were born.   
Figure 1A displays trends in measures of children’s health insurance eligibility over the 
last couple of decades.  Prior to the expansion of the Medicaid system in the mid 1980s, roughly 
16 percent of newborns and 10 percent of 9 and 13 year olds were covered, typically because 
                                                 
8 These rules were obtained from Yelowitz (1995), Shore-Sheppard (2002), and CMMS (2004). 
9 A preliminary analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth shows that about 85 percent of 
children live in the same state at age 14 as their state of birth.  Similarly, the correlation between their family’s 
income by age 3 with their income between ages 10 and 14 was 44 percent.  This estimate is almost certainly an 
understatement, attributable to measurement error in reported family income (cf. Zimmerman, 1992; and Solon, 
1992). 13 
 
their family was receiving AFDC benefits.  Eligibility among very young children (newborns in 
this figure) started to rise in the late 1980s and then for somewhat older children (9 year olds in 
this figure) in the early 1990s, and finally for older children (13 year olds in this figure) starting 
in the mid 1990s.  By 2003, we find that over 50 percent of all newborns and over 40 percent of 
9 and 13 year olds are eligible for public health insurance. 
The change in eligibility associated solely with the income-based Medicaid expansions is 
depicted in Figure 1B.  This is an important figure because the key explanatory variables in our 
regression models reflect Medicaid eligibility solely attributable to the income-based 
expansions.
10  In this figure, eligibility is set at zero prior to 1987 because eligibility was still tied 
to the income thresholds associated with welfare.  It was beginning in that year and initially for 
infants that income thresholds for eligibility began to rise.  Within a couple of years, about one-
third of all newborns were eligible for Medicaid.  For nine year olds, the improved access to 
coverage began in earnest in 1992; by 1992 about one-quarter of children at this age were 
eligible.  The process was a bit more gradual for 13 year olds, as eligibility rose from a negligible 
level to about one-quarter of 13 year old children by 1996.  For children of all ages the expansion 
of eligibility brought about by SCHIP continued the escalation of eligibility through the end of 
our sample period. 
Figures 2 and 3 depict the nature of the variation in public health insurance eligibility that 
we are able to exploit in our econometric analysis.  In each figure, the y-axis measures the 
standard deviation in eligibility rates across states and the x-axis measures the year in which the 
test is taken; 4
th graders and 8
th graders are compared separately.  The figures are distinguished 
by eligibility at birth (Figure 2) and contemporaneous eligibility (Figure 3).  Figure 2 shows that 
                                                 
10 The reason for this is because of the difficulty of projecting backwards an individual’s family structure based on 
contemporaneous data, which is all the information that we have available. 14 
 
the variation across states in rates of eligibility at birth began in 1996 among 4
th graders (age 9) 
and in 2000 for 8
th graders (age 13), which is consistent with the initial introduction of these state 
options in 1987.
11  The extent of that variation increased considerably once this process began to 
spread across the states.  An important lesson from this figure is that there is considerable 
variability in the time series patterns between 4
th and 8
th graders.  For those currently eligible, we 
see that the variation across states was greatest in the period just prior to SCHIP in 1997, 
particularly for the 13 year olds.  When SCHIP went into effect, it reduced disparities in 
eligibility among older children.  Those disparities were greatest in the years preceding it as 
states were allowed to offer eligibility to older children, but weren’t required to.  This is the 
nature of the variability that we exploit in our subsequent empirical analysis. 
In addition to our two main data sources, we also use additional data from the Vital 
Statistics system as well as other CPS data.  In specifications where we consider specific 
children’s health outcomes, we take advantage of Vital Statistics data on infant mortality and low 
birth weight.  We use additional data from the CPS to construct measures of the demographic 
features of a state’s population over time (used as explanatory variables in our regressions) to 
help control for some of the time-varying covariates within a state.  Each month, one quarter of 
the CPS sample exits the survey; data for members of these “outgoing rotation groups” over the 
course of a full year are available and the use of these data provides a sample size three times the 
size of any single survey.  We use these data to measure demographic characteristics, including 
age, race, marital status, and educational attainment.  Our final source of data is state level data 
on the unemployment rate, which is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
                                                 
11The variation across states in eligibility at birth increased again in 2001 among 4
th graders and 2005 among 8
th 
graders.  The reason for this is that most states standardized their eligibility cutoffs for young children, including 
newborns, at 133 percent of the poverty line in 1991, but then states began getting more generous after that, with 
some states expanding coverage to young children up to 300% of the poverty line.   
 15 
 
VI.  RESULTS 
To begin our empirical analysis, we first report the results of estimating models of the 
form of equation (4), which reflects the reduced form relationship between test scores in 
different subjects/grades as a function of public health insurance eligibility at birth, since birth, 
and contemporaneously.  We also report results from a “triple differences” estimating strategy, 
comparing results between 4
th and 8
th graders as a function of differential exposure to our three 
measures of public health insurance eligibility.   
Results from these reduced form specifications are reported in Table 3.  These 
specifications include three different measures of exposure to public health insurance: the 
percentage eligible in a student’s year of birth, the percentage of life eligible since birth, and the 
percentage currently eligible.  In this specification, the variability in the percentage of life 
eligible since birth is identified based on variability in eligibility in the years following birth and 
prior to the current year.  For instance, at age 9 this variable is identified based on variability in 
eligibility in years 1 through 8 of the student’s life.
12 
The results in Table 3 indicate that we are unable to detect an impact of any of our health 
insurance measures on reading test scores separately in 4
th or 8
th grades.  When we introduce the 
third difference and compare results for 4
th and 8
th graders (in effect sweeping out state-by-time 
fixed effects) and relate that difference to differences in public health insurance exposure, 
however, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between eligibility at birth 
                                                 
12 Each of these measures of eligibility can have different effects on current test scores because there is no reason to 
expect that the impact of health insurance eligibility should be linear over a child’s life.  In fact, since health 
problems at birth are so much more common than health problems subsequent to birth, one might anticipate that 
reducing the health problems at birth would have a larger effect on subsequent life outcomes.  Currie, Decker, and 
Lin (2008) find a result consistent with this fact.  In their work, they find that Medicaid eligibility at very young ages 
has a positive impact on future health status despite the fact that current Medicaid eligibility is not found to have an 
impact.   
 16 
 
and reading scores (Column 3).
13  This pattern of results suggests that contemporaneous factors 
affecting both 4
th and 8
th graders are introducing a bias that the triple difference strategy can 
resolve.  We are unable to detect any impact on math test scores in 4
th grade, 8
th grade, or in the 
difference between grades in response to any of the measures of public health insurance 
eligibility.   
The results for reading test scores support the notion that expanding access to public 
health insurance may improve educational performance.  The estimated magnitude of this effect 
is relatively small.  A 50 percentage point increase in public health insurance eligibility at birth is 
estimated to increase reading test scores by 3 scaled points (or 0.091 standard deviation) on a 
base of about 239 (the mean of the 4
th and 8
th grade mean scaled scores).  Of course, 
improvements in reading scores are only one of the potential benefits of health insurance 
expansions.
14 
Although these results are informative, the reduced form nature of this analysis prevents 
us from identifying the mechanisms at work in generating test score gains.  As we have 
previously described, this finding could be attributable to improvements in health outcomes or 
the increased family resources available to the extent that crowd out occurs (or some 
combination of the two).  In the remainder of this discussion, we attempt to determine whether 
we can identify specifically the role that health improvements may play.  We focus our attention 
on health status at birth since insurance access at births appears to be driving the improvement in 
reading test scores.  We use rates of low birth weight and infant mortality as our measures of 
                                                 
13 Results for eligibility at birth are quite similar if we omit controls for contemporaneous and lifetime eligibility. 
14We attempted one extension of this analysis directed at identifying whether the estimated impact of the expansions 
differed by time period.  This could occur if, for instance, the impact differed at different levels of the income 
distribution since the system’s expansion over time affected different portions of the income distribution.   
Unfortunately, the limitations of the NAEP data made such an exercise too weak to be useful.  Because the data 
exist for sporadic years and are not consistent between tests at different grades, the sample size is significantly 
limited when we try to separate out early and later years for the analysis, particularly in the triple difference models. 
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children’s health.  This is not to say that these are the only channels through which public health 
insurance can improve children’s health, but these are two measures for which data are available 
on the scale necessary to conduct this exercise.  We see them as markers of children’s health 
status that may capture part, but by no means all, of the improvement in health associated with 
access to health insurance. 
Our first approach is to provide additional evidence that increased public health insurance 
access at birth has an impact on children’s health status.  Methodologically, we estimate models 
that take the general form of equation (2), augmenting this statistical model with state and year 
fixed effects along with state-specific linear trends.
15  These regressions are comparable to those 
used in past work, like Currie and Gruber (1996a and 1996b) and Joyce and Racine (2003).  The 
contribution here is that we expand the time period covered to encompass both the earlier period 
of Medicaid expansions along with the more recent introduction and implementation of SCHIP 
to get a broader picture of the role that public health insurance has played in affecting children’s 
health status.   
In these regressions, we estimate models aggregated to births to all mothers and 
separately for mothers who differ by their level of educational attainment.  Since public health 
insurance expansions should be more likely to affect less educated mothers, we should observe 
estimated effects that are greater for those groups.  When we conduct our analysis using infant 
mortality rates by mothers’ level of education, our sample is restricted because linked natality 
and infant death records are only currently available for 1984-1991 and 1995-2001.  These 
linked records are necessary to attach the mother’s level of education to the child’s death.  We 
use data from 1984-2003 in the remainder of the analysis.  In these specifications, all regressions 
                                                 
15 We are able to use state-specific linear trends in this part of our analysis because of the longer time series of data 
available within each state.  In our analysis using the NAEP data, there are too few observations within states to 
yield robust results when we include state-specific trends. 18 
 
are weighted by the number of births in the state/year to help resolve issues of heteroskedasticity 
that arise from the different sample sizes in each state.  Here (and elsewhere) standard errors are 
clustered at the state level to correct for arbitrary covariance structures over time within states. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4.  The top panel provides results from 
models in which the dependent variable is the rate of low birth weight.  For children as a whole, 
7.3 percent of children are born weighing less than 2500 kg (the cut-off for a determination of 
low birth weight).  This rate varies with mother’s level of education, ranging from 9.2 percent for 
children of mothers who are high school dropouts to 5.6 percent for children of mothers who 
graduated from college.  The results indicate that greater health insurance eligibility reduces the 
rate of low birth weight children for women as a whole.
16  They also indicate that the estimated 
impact of greater public health insurance eligibility declines as a mother’s education increases, as 
one would predict since more highly educated women are less likely to qualify for public health 
insurance.   
To gauge the magnitude of the estimated impact, note that the percentage of children 
eligible for public health insurance at birth solely attributable to the income-based Medicaid 
expansions rose by about 40 percentage points between the mid 1980s and mid 1990s (i.e. just 
prior to the introduction of SCHIP).  Based on our estimates for all women (coefficient of about -
0.3), this implies a 0.12 percentage point reduction in the rate of low birth weight in response to 
the expansions to public health insurance eligibility among children.  With a base rate of 7.3 
percent, this reflects a modest 1.6 percent reduction. 
                                                 
16 Although earlier Medicaid expansions clearly included prenatal care, the coverage of prenatal care in the SCHIP 
expansions is less clear.  We estimated our low birth weight regressions separately for the two periods (1996 and 
earlier compared to post-1996) and find that the results reported here are largely driven by those from the Medicaid 
expansion period. 19 
 
We also find some evidence of a small effect when we examine the impact on infant 
mortality.  When we focus our analysis on births to women with a high school degree, a group 
likely to be affected by the policy change, we see a marginally statistically significant reduction 
in infant mortality associated with an increase in public health insurance eligibility.  Again, the 
magnitude of these estimates is modest.  The mean infant mortality rate is 0.867 per 1000 births 
to women with a high school degree.  If there is a 40 percentage point increase in public health 
insurance eligibility among children at birth, this rate would decline by 0.058 per 1000 births, or 
6.7 percent among women with a high school degree who gave birth.  The impact on infant 
mortality more broadly would be smaller than that. 
We can conclude from this analysis that the expansion of public health insurance does 
appear to have improved the health status of children.  The magnitudes of the impact on low 
birth weight and infant mortality are not large, but these individual measures of children’s health 
may not completely capture the true impact on the well-being of children in ways that would 
affect their educational attainment.  Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from testing other 
measures of health status.  The fact that we are able to detect impacts on children’s health using 
these broad measures suggest that other aspects of health may have been improved as well in 
ways that could affect educational outcomes.   
We move on to consider the direct relationship between child health and test score 
outcomes, as represented by equation (1) augmented by state and year fixed effects.  As before, 
our measures of educational outcomes are test scores in reading and math in 4
th and 8
th grades, 
and children’s health status is proxied by the infant mortality rate and the rate of low birth weight 
in the year the children were born.  As noted above, it is difficult to attribute causality in a model 
like this, because if other underlying social conditions were changing – either at the time the test 20 
 
scores were measured, or at the time of the children’s birth – within the state, that would 
generate a spurious relationship between test scores and health.  Although the triple-difference 
approach alleviates this problem somewhat if both the 4
th and 8
th graders were exposed to many 
of the same contemporaneous factors, nonetheless changes in underlying social conditions in the 
state that differentially affected the different birth cohorts could still introduce bias. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5.
17  Among both 4
th and 8
th grade 
students we are unable to see a consistent pattern in the relationship between health status at birth 
and test scores.  Higher infant mortality rates in the student’s year of birth are estimated to 
significantly reduce math scores in 4
th grade and reading scores in both grades, but rates of low 
birth weight are not found to be significantly associated with test scores in either grade.   
Columns 3 and 6 repeat this analysis, but focusing on the difference in test scores between 
cohorts in relation to the difference in health status in birth.  Here we see a consistent 
relationship that cohorts born in worse health, measured by infant mortality and low birth weight, 
appear to perform worse on reading tests.  With a mean infant mortality rate in our sample of 
0.9 (per 1000 births) and a mean rate of low birth weight of 8 (per 100 births), these estimates 
are not very large.  A 4 percentage point increase in the rate of low birth weight – that is, a 
50  percent increase in the rate – would decrease reading test scores by about 4 points (or 
0.12 standard deviation) on a base value of 238.7 pooled across the 4
th and 8
th grade mean scores.  
                                                 
17 The analysis reported in Tables 4 and 5 can be thought of like a first stage and a structural equation in a two-stage 
least squares model for which instrumental variables may be considered a viable estimation strategy.  We have 
chosen not to go down that path for two reasons.  First, the “first stage” regressions in Table 4 take advantage of the 
maximum amount of Vital Statistics data available.  The test score models in Table 5 are estimated using a restricted 
set of state/year cells based on NAEP data availability.  If we estimate the first stage regressions on this limited 
number of cells, we lose sufficient power that nothing is statistically significant, so estimating a formal IV model 
would provide a very weak test.  Second, this IV model would suggest that the only avenue that Medicaid 
expansions would alter educational outcomes would be through low birth weight or infant mortality.  Those two 
health outcomes are used in this analysis as markers of health conditions that may be affected by Medicaid 
expansions, but are not meant to be the exclusive mechanisms.   
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Put into a different context, the nationwide rate of low birth weight births increased by 0.8 points 
(from 6.8 to 7.6 per 100) from 1980 to 2000.  An increase of this magnitude would imply a mean 
reading test score decline of 0.025 standard deviations.  Similarly, a health improvement 
associated with a 0.5 increase in the infant mortality rate would reduce reading test scores by 
2.4 points (or 0.07 standard deviation). 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
  The results of our analysis suggest that children’s greater access to public health 
insurance at birth improved their performance on standardized tests of reading ability.  We then 
focused our analysis at determining whether we could find evidence that this effect was 
generated by actual improvements in children’s health associated with the expanded access as 
opposed to (or at least in addition to) greater resources available to families through crowd out of 
private insurance.  We found additional evidence supporting the relationship between insurance 
eligibility and infant health outcomes.  Our findings in this regard augment past research that has 
also obtained this result.  In addition, we were also able to directly link infant health outcomes, in 
the form of low birth weight and infant mortality, to reading test scores.  This evidence expands 
upon previous research that has found low birth weight to be negatively related to educational 
outcomes.  Although our findings in this part of the analysis are subject to methodological 
limitations, combined with the past literature we believe that they provide meaningful evidence 
of a link between infant health and test scores.  Taken as a whole, we find that the improvement 
in reading test scores associated with children’s public health insurance expansions is at least 
partially attributable to direct improvements in children’s health. 22 
 
  One interesting aspect of our findings is that we are only to identify a relationship 
between children’s health at birth and reading test scores, but not math test scores.  Why would 
one set of scores be affected, but not the other?  Jacob (2005) proposes a potential explanation 
imbedded in a statement he made regarding the results of an accountability study he conducted:  
“This is consistent with a number of education evaluations that show larger effects in math than 
reading, presumably because reading achievement is determined by a host of family and other 
non-school factors while math achievement is determined largely by school (p. 771).”  If this 
viewpoint is correct, then it is likely that health improvements would fall into the category of 
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Notes: Entries in table show maximum age of eligibility, then maximum income as a percentage of the poverty line.  For simplicity, eligibility is as of January of 
calendar year. 
Sources: Yelowitz (1995), Shore-Sheppard (2002), and CMMS (2004).  
 
Table 2:  Public Health Insurance Eligibility for Children 
with Family Income at 120 Percent of the Poverty Line by Selected State and Age 
State and  
Birth Year 
covered at age:  years covered by age: 
0  9 13 9 13 
California       
     1986  no  no  yes  1  2 
     1988  no  no  yes  3  6 
     1990  yes  yes  yes  7  11 
T e x a s        
     1986  no  no  yes  1  2 
     1988  no  no  yes  3  6 
     1990  yes  no  yes  6  9 
New  York       
     1986  no  yes  yes  5  6 
     1988  no  no  yes  5  8 
     1990  Yes  yes  yes  7  11 
F l o r i d a       
     1986  no  no  yes  1  2 
     1988  no  no  yes  3  6 
     1990  yes  yes  yes  7  11 
I l l i n o i s       
     1986  no  no  yes  1  2 
     1988  no  no  yes  3  6 
     1990  no  yes  yes  6  10 
Note: This table reflects eligibility for a child born in January of the given year.  
 


























Percentage eligible in  2.138 1.049  5.815   0.844 2.384 -1.629 
in student’s year of birth  (3.641) (4.854)  (2.365)    (4.102) (4.446) (2.265) 
            
Mean Percentage of Life  -7.833 -18.453  -5.177    -12.723 -3.298  -0.709 
Eligible since birth  (8.104) (12.168)  (13.979)    (8.159) (9.708)  (10.476) 
            
Percentage Currently  3.318 4.926  9.583   3.838 2.1 2.186 
Eligible  (4.272) (5.826)  (28.148)   (3.384) (2.778) (3.093) 
             
Sample  Size  262  169  169    227 261 223 
Notes:  Regressions are based on aggregated state/year NAEP test score data and simulated Medicaid eligibility measures by state in 
students’ state/year of residence.  In models where the outcome is the difference in scores between the two grades, the eligibility 
measures are calculated as the difference in rates between the two birth cohorts.  Additional explanatory variables in “undifferenced” 
models include the unemployment rate, the percentage of the population that is married, the percentage white, the percentage who 
have dropped out of high school, are high school graduates, and have attended some college, and the percentage of the state’s 
population that is 0-4, 5-17, 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, and 65+.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Regressions are 
unweighted.  
 










Mothers with Less 
than HS Degree 
(3) 
Mothers with HS 
Degree 
(4) 






   
Low Birth Weight 
 
Percentage of Cohort  -0.298  --- -0.985  -0.784  -0.693  -0.311 
Eligible at Birth (x100)  (0.138)  --- (0.390)  (0.420)  (0.384)  (0.233) 
            
Mean Rate (x100)  7.267  ---  9.173  7.580  6.527  5.598 
Sample Size  1,020  ---  1,020  1,020  1,020  1,020 
   
Infant Mortality Rate 
 
Percentage of Cohort  -0.036  -0.017 -0.137 -0.146 -0.071 -0.030 
Eligible at Birth (x100)  (0.029)  (0.054) (0.113) (0.088) (0.080) (0.053) 
            
Mean Rate (x100)  0.847  0.845  1.118  0.867  0.681  0.509 
Sample Size  1,020  765  765  765  765  765 
Notes:  Infant mortality regressions include a “full sample,” obtained from published reports on aggregate state/year infant mortality 
rates and a “restricted sample,” where aggregate rates were calculated from linked birth/infant death Vital Statistics microdata.  All 
birth weight data was calculated from Vital Statistics Natality microdata.  All models include state and year fixed effects along with 
state-specific linear trends.  Additional explanatory variables include the unemployment rate, the percentage of the population that is 
married, the percentage white, the percentage who have dropped out of high school, are high school graduates, and have attended 
some college, and the percentage of the state’s population that is 0-4, 5-17, 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, and 65+.  Standard errors are 






























Mean of Dependent 
Variable 215.9  261.5  -45.1    227.5  271.3  -45.2 
Sample Size  262  169  169    227  261  223 
   
Infant Mortality Rate 
 
Rate per 1,000 births  -10.857  -9.583 -4.868    -7.853 -4.814 -1.166 
in student’s year of birth  (3.478)  (4.654) (2.240)    (3.030) (3.185) (1.195) 
   
Rate of Low Birth Weight 
 
Rate per 100 births  -0.266  0.687  -1.058    0.928  0.839  0.277 
in student’s year of birth  (0.656)  (0.564) (0.325)    (1.040) (0.767) (0.419) 
Notes:  Regressions are based on aggregated state/year NAEP test score data and Vital Statistics data on rates of infant mortality rate 
and low birth weight by state in students’ state/year of birth.  In models where the outcome is the difference in scores between the two 
grades, the infant mortality rate and the rate of low birth weight are measured as the difference in rates between the two birth cohorts.  
Additional explanatory variables in “undifferenced” models include the unemployment rate, the percentage of the population that is 
married, the percentage white, the percentage who have dropped out of high school, are high school graduates, and have attended 
some college, and the percentage of the state’s population that is 0-4, 5-17, 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, and 65+.  All models include state 



























Figure 1A:  Trends in Children's Eligibility for Public Health Insurance




























Figure 1B:  Trends in Children's Eligibility for Public Health Insurance through Income-Based Waivers



















































Figure 2:  Variation across States in Percentage Medicaid Eligible at Birth





















































Figure 3:  Variation across States in Percentage Currently Medicaid Eligible
4th Graders   8th Graders  